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ABSTRACT
Policy research is valuable as a source of information for decisionmakers.  The
value of research is the expected social gain from policy decisions influenced by the
information generated.  The gain from a decision depends on choosing the best policy
given the state of the world, which is uncertain.  The output of policy research is a
conclusion about that state.  Taking a Bayesian approach, the ex ante value of a research
program is estimated from information about decisionmakers’ prior probabilities of the
state of the world and the likelihood of correct and incorrect research findings.
Case studies of U.S. agricultural policy research cover consequences of trade
liberalization, farm commodity program analysis, effects of publicly supported
commodity promotion, and the value of publicly funded crop forecasting and research on
agricultural technology.  The quantification of the value of these research programs is
highly conjectural, but consideration of their likely magnitude, as compared to the costs
of the research, suggests that there are substantial net social gains.1
INTRODUCTION
Measuring the returns to social science research is a task so daunting that it might
be best to avoid even attempting it, except for one fact: decisions have to be made about
funding such research.  As a former U.S. government official in charge of arguing the
merits of budget proposals for the Economic Research Service of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, the author felt keenly the need for reasonably objective criteria for evaluating
the program proposed.  This need was never satisfied.  Nonetheless, budgetary arguments
were laid out and decisions made.  Some lessons from this activity will be discussed later. 
The paper will begin by going to first principles to consider how a systematic evaluation
of the merits of policy-related research might be organized conceptually.  Then it will
examine several cases.  Unfortunately, these can be only feebly quantified.  The evidence
available indicates that the returns to policy-related research in agricultural economics
have been larger than the costs of the research, most likely by a substantial amount.
ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR MEASURING RETURNS TO POLICY
RESEARCH
The valuation of policy research requires estimation of the difference the research
makes in peoples’ actions and its value.  Most of the actions involved are political. 
Political actions are those of policymakers in government.  They are also lobbying actions
of private citizens seeking to influence government.  For example, evaluations of the
returns from publicly funded research on agricultural production influence both decisions
about public spending on agricultural research and lobbying actions by producer or
consumer groups for or against such spending.
Policy Research as Information for Decisionmakers Facing Uncertainty
Policy research is an intermediate product, an input into a political decision.  It is
helpful to think of the product of policy research as information.  Following Hirshleifer
and Riley (1992, Chapter 5) information is not a stock of certain knowledge, but a flow or
increment of “news” or “messages” of uncertain reliability about a state of affairs that is
itself uncertain.  This characterization of the output of policy research lends itself
naturally to a treatment of policy actors as Bayesian decisionmakers under uncertainty. 
Lindner (1987) takes a similar view of agricultural economics research generally, whether
policy-directed or not.
To see how this characterization works analytically, Figure 1 uses as an example a
two-state world.  State 1, S , is a world in which export demand for a commodity is 1
inelastic.  State 2, S , is a world in which export demand for that same commodity is 2
elastic.  It is not known which of these two states the world is in.  A goal for a research
program is to determine which state prevails.Returns to Policy-Related Social Science Research in Agriculture
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Two policy actions are possible:  A , an acreage control program; and A , a 1             2
production subsidy program.  The value of any policy outcome is measured by V(i, j)
where i is the state of the world and j is the policy chosen.  In Hirshleifer and Riley, as in
decision theory generally, V is utility, but for this paper V is a weighted sum of benefits to
producers and consumer-taxpayers.  There are four possible outcomes, shown as points  
M , N , M , and N .  If policy A  is chosen, the result is point M  if demand is inelastic and 1   1   2     2        1              1
M  if it is elastic.  If A  is chosen, the result is N  if demand is inelastic and N  if it is 2             2            1            2
elastic.  The policymaker will regret choosing A  if demand is elastic, and A  if demand is 1            2
inelastic.  The horizontal dimension of Figure 1 measures subjective probabilities, B , of 2
S  (increasing left to right from 0 to 1)—and this implies B  since B  + B  = 1.  Suppose 2                      1    1    2
there is maximum uncertainty about S  and S  in the sense that either outcome could occur 1    2
with equal probability:  B  = B  = 0.5.  The expected value of V can then be maximized by 1    2
choosing policy A , giving expected V at point H. 1
Now consider the value of a research program to estimate the elasticity of export
demand.  The research program will conclude that demand is either inelastic or elastic,
but it may be incorrect.  Suppose the uncertainties are as given by the following
probabilities:
Research findings
True state Inelastic Elastic
S :  Inelastic 0.8 0.2 1
S :  Elastic 0.3 0.7 2
If demand is inelastic in reality, there is an 80 percent probability that the research
will correctly obtain this finding.  But there is a 20 percent probability the research will
incorrectly say that demand is elastic.  It is slightly harder to detect that the true state is
elastic—the research program will give the correct result with a 70 percent probability
and the incorrect result with a 30 percent probability.  These likelihoods provide us with
an operational measure of research quality—the probability that the research findings are
accurate.
If Bayes’ theorem is used to calculate the posterior probabilities, and the
assumption is made that it would be equally likely beforehand that demand would be Returns to Policy-Related Social Science Research in Agriculture
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elastic or inelastic (that is, probability is 0.5 for each state), the following posterior
probabilities would result:  
1
Research findings
True state Inelastic Elastic
S :  Inelastic 0.7 0.2 1
S :  Elastic 0.3 0.8 2
In Figure 1, if the finding were that demand was inelastic, then B  = 0.3, and A1 2
would be chosen with expected benefits at R.  If the finding were that demand was
elastic, then B  = 0.8 and the choice would be A  with expected benefits at point T.  So 2                2
the research makes no difference in the choice in the first case, but it causes a reversal of
course in the second.
What is the ex ante value of the research program?  Assuming that each finding
was equally likely before the research program was undertaken, the expected value of V
is the mean of R and T, which is plotted at point G.  The value of the research program is
the distance G-H (the length of the double-headed arrow).
The two-state Bayesian model is simple but nonetheless helpful in pinpointing the 
determinants of the value of research.  In particular, three elements determine the value of
the research.  First, the value of acting upon the information the research provides, if the
information is correct.  (This is M ! N  if the research finds S , and N ! M  if the 1   1          1     2   2
research finds S .)  Second, prior knowledge about the subject of the research.  (In Figure 2
1, the prior probabilities of 0.5 for each state represent the absence of prior knowledge). 
Third, the quality of the research, as measured by the likelihood that research findings are
correct.  (In Figure 1, this is the likelihood matrix that places us at point R or T.)
The significance of the model is, first, that these three elements are the only
aspects of the research situation that matter, and second, that the model shows how to put
these elements together to calculate a dollar value for the ex ante value of the research. 
Moreover, the model helps confirm which common-sense intuitions about the value of
research are most likely to make a difference.  For example, the following propositions
can be obtained straightforwardly from the model:Returns to Policy-Related Social Science Research in Agriculture
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! If we already know the state of the world, research is valueless.  Proof: 
“knowledge” means B = 0 or B = 1.  Applying the model using these prior
probabilities always generates the same posterior probabilities (0 or 1).  Therefore,
the policy choice cannot be influenced by research and there is no opportunity for
social gain.
! The research is valueless if it does not reveal information about the true state of
the world.  Proof:  No information means the likelihood of each of the two states
is 0.5, regardless of the research findings.  Applying the model with this
likelihood matrix means that the posterior probabilities are the same as the prior
probabilities, so that R and T in Figure 1 cannot differ from their pre-research
position (someone who started at point H, would end up at point H.)
! The research is valueless if the same policy is preferred for all states of the world
the research considers.  Proof:  In Figure 1, this situation would be represented by
having both N  > M  and M  > N  (the inequalities could be reversed).  A  (or A ) 2    2    1    1             1    2
would then be chosen regardless of the location of H, R, or T.  So there would be
no gain from the research.
! The ex ante value of research is nonnegative.  This is a less obvious result.  It is
true that some findings (or “messages”) have no value:  in the export demand
elasticity example, a finding of inelastic demand would make no difference in any
action taken.  But even so the research program — the “message service,” in
Hirshleifer and Riley’s terminology — has some value as long as it reduces
uncertainty about the world sufficiently.  In Figure 1, B would increase to about
0.6, where N N  and M M  cross.  Even uninformative research — research that 1 2    1 2
delivers no news, that leaves the posterior probabilities the same as the prior
probabilities — has value no less than zero because it makes no difference in
action taken.
2
In contrast to this result, analyses of crop information, as in Lave (1963) or
Bullock (1976), show that improved information can make its users (producers) worse
off.  In the cases used by Lave and Bullock, this occurs because producers react to short-
crop information by making prices lower than they would be without the information.  No
single producer generates these prices, but their joint response does.   More generally, a
3
problem is that the direct users of information make up only part of an economy. 
Bradford and Kelejian (1978) provide a more complete evaluation of the welfare of crop
forecasting information with Bayesian market participants.  In their model the socialReturns to Policy-Related Social Science Research in Agriculture
Impact Assessment No. 9 May 1999
Bruce L. Gardner Page 5
5
value of improved information is nonnegative (though of course the additional value may
be less than the cost of providing the additional information).
The approach used by Hirshleifer/Riley (or Bradford/Kelejian) is relevant for an
evaluation of the information generated by policy research.  They assume that
policymakers take into account all the effects of what they do and can use the research or
not as they see fit.   Nonetheless, this approach, with its ex ante consideration of the
4
research program in the Bayesian context, has demanding requirements for information,
as Graham-Tomasi (1984) notes with reference to papers by Chavas and Pope (1984) and
Antonovitz and Roe (1984) on producers’ use of information under uncertainty.  One
needs not only the probabilities of true states of the world given researchers’ estimates,
but also the ex ante probabilities of the accuracy of researchers’ findings.  It is necessary
to assume that policymakers can carry out a professional evaluation of the research
findings they use, at least sufficiently to determine their expected value.  This is largely
what their professional staffs are for.
The Hirshleifer/Riley framework also suggests that research can be valuable
simply by reducing the range of uncertainty about the state of the world, no matter what
point estimate is discovered.  In Figure 1, increased evidence moves the user toward one
state or the other (the probability of state 2 gets nearer 0 or 1).  Whichever way the
research program takes the user, its ex ante value increases as points R and T are pushed
farther apart.  This will be true so long as these are policy options better suited to some
states of nature than to others.  If the policies generate the same utility no matter what the
world is like, then there would be no point in using policy research to determine the state
of the world, according to the proposition that research is valueless if the same policy is
preferred for all states.
Quantifying the Gains:  National Income
The effect of policy research on political choices will be referred to as the action-
difference caused by the research.  It is a measure of the output of policy research.  The
value of this output will often be difficult to measure.  The approach used in this paper is
grounded in the idea that the value of the research is the well-being generated by the
action-difference.  Welfare economics offers a rigorous theoretical basis for some
judgments about well-being, using compensation principles.  However, this body of
theory is not fully applicable even in well-worn areas such as the use of GDP as a
measure of social well-being.  A practical approach must frankly be limited to a partial
assessment.  The discussion in this paper will for the most part be limited in precisely theReturns to Policy-Related Social Science Research in Agriculture
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way it would be in a discussion of national income accounting:  The value of social
science research is taken as its contribution to society’s aggregate real income.
A second limitation is that no attempt is made to measure the total value of
policy-oriented social science research.  Instead, attention is restricted to marginal
changes, or to partial budgeting of social science research projects.  That approach places
the focus where it really is in practical discussion, on decreases or increases in the amount
of social science research.
The focus on the marginal valuation of aggregate effects on real income effects is
limiting in several respects.  It means, for example, that there is no place for the scientific
value of research as opposed to its economic value.  It means there is no place for a purely
cultural value of research.  This may be more of an issue in the humanities, but it is also
pertinent to the noneconomic aspects of social science.  Among other things, the focus on
GDP means that one gives no consideration to whether income redistribution of income
harms any income, ethnic, or occupational group in relation to another.  Economic
research can and often should try to estimate distributional effects, such as the gains or
losses of farmers.  Indeed, this information is often sought as a  product of research.  But
these findings add to the returns to research only as they affect an aggregate measure of
well-being.  Finally, a focus on national GDP omits any gains or losses to foreigners. 
Basic and applied social science research can be assessed by using the same
criteria, but basic research can be conceived of as a source of two inputs crucial to applied
research:  raw data and methods for drawing inferences from data.  Consequently, the
generation of data on agriculture and rural areas comes under the purview of policy-
oriented social science research, to the extent that it influences policy actions.
As an example, consider economic assessments of the returns to agricultural
production research.  An evaluation of this body of work requires estimates of its action-
difference, and of the real income the action difference has generated.  Neither estimate
could be made without a study far larger than is feasible in this paper.  The absence of
such estimates in the voluminous literature on agricultural research policy indicates the
practical impossibility of producing such estimates with confidence (see reviews in
Alston and Pardey 1996; Huffman and Evenson 1993).  The amounts and trends in public
research funding can be observed for nations and subnational areas, which are arguably
influenced by economists’ estimates of returns to research, but estimation of the action-
difference requires an estimate of the amount that would have been spent had the
economists’ estimates not been published.  Huffman and Evenson (1993, 238) argue that
governments have responded only weakly to economists’ estimates of returns.  TheirReturns to Policy-Related Social Science Research in Agriculture
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evidence consists of estimates that imply that returns to research have not been equalized
over alternative categories of research spending.  Interest-group politics appear to be more
important in allocating research spending over the alternatives.
Quantifying the Gains:  Redistribution
Because so much political action is aimed at a redistribution of well-being, the
question remains how to value policy research that influences political choices that
involve redistribution.  It is possible that research on the elasticity of demand for exports
influences policy not so much because the deadweight loss to domestic national income
from acreage left idle goes up as demand becomes more elastic, but because producer
gains, narrowly defined, go down.  A Bergsonian social welfare function can measure
gains in such cases by increases in social welfare.  A practical approximation would be
the much-used weighted sum of individual gains and losses from a policy, where the
weights are indicators of political preference that vary among individuals or groups.  The
difficulty is in determining what weights to use.  There is one respect, however, in which
it may be possible to measure gains from policy research without having to assign
weights to interest groups.  This is when policy research influences the political actions of
interest groups themselves.  For example, U.S. wool growers in 1996 voted down a
program through which they assessed themselves funds to be used for promoting wool.  If
that outcome had been the result of social science research that measured the returns of
promotion activities to producers, then the claim could justifiably be made that the gains
to producers (the difference between the market rate of return and the presumably lower
rate of return on funds invested in wool promotion) were returns to social science
research.
An important aspect of policy-related social science research, whether used by
policymakers or interest groups, is that much of it is oppositional.  A research program on
the environmental regulation of agriculture, for example, may consist of a range of
studies that increase uncertainty about the state of the world.  In terms of the
Hirshleifer/Riley framework of Figure 1, this research program would reduce expected
utility.  This result does not violate the proposition that new knowledge always has
nonnegative value; rather, this is a research program that reduces what appeared to be
knowledge.  In terms of the earlier, more formal discussion, it is a research program on
the probabilities in the likelihood matrix (relating research findings to the true state of the
world).
The preceding suggests that the framework constructed here is too narrow, for
surely there are situations in which it is better to be ignorant of it than to believe thingsReturns to Policy-Related Social Science Research in Agriculture
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that are untrue.  In fact, some political actions are constructed to be appropriate when the
state of the world simply is not known.  These actions are not typically a decision to do
nothing.
Consider policy choice in the following situation.  A large group of pesticides is
considered to be a possible danger to human health.  Regulating them would cause
substantial economic losses.  But it can also be argued that no human health dangers have
been established.  The situation can be modeled as a revision of Figure 1.  The world is
either in state 1 (pesticides are dangerous) or state 2 (pesticides are benign).  If the world
is in state 1, policy A , regulating pesticides, generates good results; but policy A , laissez 1                 2
faire, generates severe losses.  If the world is in state 2, policy A  causes large costs, while 1
policy A  is appropriate.  Now consider an oppositional research program that results not 2
in information that increases certainty that either state 1 or state 2 prevails, but instead
increases uncertainty about the true state.  This reduces the expected value of either
policy.
This is not the end of the story.  Knowing that little is known, the best course of
action would be to devise a policy attuned to this situation.  Devising policies to fit a
situation, including its uncertainties and conflicts, is indeed a key skill of the successful
policymaker.  One might suggest policy A , a pilot program of limited regulation, along 3
with monitoring of pesticide use and residues, and controlled studies in the field.  This
policy has nonlinear utility in the probabilities of the states.  It is a poor policy if the state
of the world is known to be either 1 or 2 but a good policy if the state is uncertain.
Here the following objection may be made.  The state of the world really is 1 or 2,
even if no one knows which.  What is known is that policy A  will be wrong in either 3
state.  Indeed, this line of argument is typically raised against compromise policy
proposals that call for a pilot program or for further research.  An appropriate mechanism
for choosing a policy if the experimental learning approach is inadvisable might be to
choose policy A  or A  randomly, that is, by flipping a coin.  However, the expected value 1    2
of the random-choice approach, if B = 0.5, could well be less than the utility of A  (the 3
experimental policy) at B = 0.5.  What such a case would reflect is that if B = 0.5, a pilot
program or study would help determine whether the true state was state 1 or state 2. 
What gives A  its higher utility is the expected value of being able to choose A  or A , as 3                          1    2
appropriate, in subsequent legislation.  In this example, policy-oriented social science
research is itself a policy option.
5
When oppositional research leads to greater uncertainty about the state of the
world, and information-generating policies like A  are not available, the oppositional 3Returns to Policy-Related Social Science Research in Agriculture
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research program may still prove beneficial.  This will occur when the policy choices
being determined are those of interest groups themselves, such as a choice between pieces
of legislation that a commodity group should lobby for.  In this case, with A  unavailable, 3
the decision may be to lobby for neither A  or A , but rather to withdraw from the political 1    2
debate.  If the policies are alternative schemes for redistribution, this passive outcome
will tend to increase national income, because any redistributional scheme will have
deadweight costs.  For example, the American Farm Bureau Federation has at times held
back from lobbying for higher support prices and has instead made a general argument for
lower taxes or a balanced budget.  This stance probably reflects doubt about how much
regulated support prices benefit Farm Bureau members, who are typically the more
business-oriented farmers, in the long run.  To the extent that these doubts have been
engendered or reinforced by agricultural economists who question the income-increasing
effects of price supports (for example, see Johnson 1973), then the work of such
economists has contributed to national income.
CASE STUDIES
Returns to Research:  The Value of Publicly Provided Information
The literature on the value of information on crop forecasting, which dealt mostly
with estimates produced by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), was discussed
earlier as it related to the evaluation of policy-related research.  This literature’s more
direct application is to the debate on public spending for agricultural commodity
forecasting.  In addition to the papers cited earlier, some notable published research can
be found in Doll (1971), Freebairn (1976), Ryan and Perrin (1974), Antonovitz and Roe
(1984), and Babcock (1990).  Irwin (1996) provides a comprehensive review and
assessment of the implications of this literature for the social value of public situation and
outlook programs.
As an example of the use of this kind of research in policy discussion, the AAEA
Data Task Force states:
While valuing information presents a complex challenge conceptually and
empirically, several efforts have been made to measure the economic value
of agricultural statistics.  Based on data from the 1960s, Hayami and
Peterson estimated the net benefits of improving the accuracy of NASS
(U.S. National Agricultural Statistics Service) (then the Statistical
Reporting Service) production estimates for a large number of farmReturns to Policy-Related Social Science Research in Agriculture
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commodities.  Even under conservative assumptions, a reduction from 2.5
to 2.0 percent error (which in general is a NASS goal) returns $100 for
every dollar invested.  A little later Bradford and Kelejian (1977 and 1978)
— using a different model, data from 1955–1975, and a Bayesian rather
than a “naive” loss function — provided a different measure.  They
produced an estimate of $64.29 million (1975 dollars) for the annuitized
annual value to the U.S. economy of eliminating sampling errors in
NASS’s monthly estimates, just for winter wheat production.  Antonovitz
and Roe calculate the annual social benefit gain of $78 million annually
from the adoption of USDA outlook forecasts by U.S. feed cattle
producers.  (AAEA 1996, 10).
Irwin (1996) develops a further argument that the observed effects of USDA crop
reports on market prices are evidence that these prices generally respond to changing
conditions more quickly with these reports than they would otherwise, and that this is a
significant source of welfare gains.
Suppose that the finding of the literature is correct, that net social benefits of
NASS data are large.  To be concrete, suppose that a cut of $10 million annually in the
NASS commodity data program is being considered — as it was in the early 1990s.  
6
Suppose further that the social value of the information lost would be $20 million
annually, that is, that the studies are correct about the net social gains from these
estimates.  This estimate of gain is far less than the $100 gain per $1 spent of Hayami and
Peterson, but one has also to give some weight to others’ far lower estimates of net gains,
OMB assertions that some NASS surveys have costs in excess of their gains, and even the
views of some legislators and citizens that NASS estimates as a whole are valueless or
worse (for example, see Weber 1997).
To take a more modest assessment, suppose there is a $10 million annual net
social gain from maintaining rather than cutting the NASS budget ($20 million marginal
information value minus $10 million marginal cost).  To place a value on the social
science research that generated this estimate, one has to estimate the change in the
probability of a budget reduction caused by the research findings.  How has research on
the value of information actually influenced the policy process that determines the NASS
budget?  The key places to look are decisions by the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) and USDA’s arguments to OMB in the executive branch and the appropriations
committees in Congress along with the authorizations made by agriculture committees
concerning agricultural data.  While commodity groups dominate agricultural policy, their
voice is usually muted and the messages somewhat mixed with respect to NASS and dataReturns to Policy-Related Social Science Research in Agriculture
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issues.  This means that the influence of agricultural interests in maintaining NASS barely
outweigh the generic arguments of budget cutters’ for reducing NASS appropriations.  In
this context, the value-of-information literature does make a difference.  It makes a
difference not because congressional appropriators or their staffs read this literature, but
because they listen to experts from the administration and nongovernmental institutions,
upon whom they rely for substantive judgment.  Experts in the administration and
elsewhere do not typically rely on particular studies cited, but on the general climate of
opinion among professional economists — who are well represented both on the staffs of
congressional committees and in the executive branch (and not just in USDA).  And it is
this climate, expressed in the AAEA Task Force report quoted above, that provides the
favorable reception to additional spending and resistance to cuts in NASS.
In short, it is not extravagantly optimistic, and indeed it is fairly conservative, to
suppose that the body of social science research on agricultural commodity data bears half
the responsibility for the decision not to cut $10 million from NASS in FY 1991.  Given
the earlier estimate of a $10 million net gain for this decision ($20 million marginal social
benefit minus $10 million marginal cost), the expected value of the social science
research would be $5 million annually, for as long as its influence lasts.
This preceding is a marginal calculation, related to a $10 million change in the
NASS budget change.  The corresponding total assessment would involve an estimate of
total federal expenditures on agricultural statistics (by NASS, parts of the Economic
Research Service, the Agricultural Marketing Service, and in the agricultural censuses) in
the absence of  research findings on the value of all publicly generated information in
agriculture.  The literature contains no estimate of that value, or even a wild guess.  But
again, the policy influence is through a general sense that the public information
enterprise generates net social gains.  That general sense would, however, probably exist
among economists even in the absence of research on the specific value-of-information
issues cited earlier.  So even if economics as a field of expertise is responsible for the size
of the agricultural statistics budget (though it is too small, according to the predominant
estimates), it would not be correct to attribute the gains to specific empirical studies. 
Nonetheless, these studies have strengthened the general view that favors the provision of 
data by public agencies.
RATE OF RETURN TO AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH
A related, but larger and more widely known body of social science research is on
the benefits of research that results in technological improvements in agriculturalReturns to Policy-Related Social Science Research in Agriculture
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production.  The value of that social science research can be assessed in a way that
parallels the discussion of agricultural statistics.  Again, prevailing estimates are that the
social rate of return is quite high, well above going rates of interest, and even above the
arguably more meaningfully comparable rates of return to private entrepreneurial
investment before taxes.  Estimates that public investment yields net social gains prevail
among economists, even with the complications that research is undertaken privately as
well as publicly and that there are a variety of technical reasons why many studies
overestimate the returns relevant at the current margin (see Alston and Pardey 1996,
Chapters 6 and 7).
Thus there is once again the question of the role that research on the rate of return
has played in determining the amount of the public spending on  research.  In this case,
however, none of the many authors who have worked on returns to research have
published an assessment of the difference this body of work has made in policy choice. 
Huffman and Evenson supply evidence, as noted earlier, that public decisions on the
allocation of research funds do not follow exactly the suggestions made in rate of return
studies.  But that does not mean that policymakers are uninfluenced by those studies, or
that policymakers use their findings suboptimally.  One of the services of the Bayesian
valuation model of Figure 1 is to show how research findings can be valuable to rational
decisionmakers even though decisionmakers do not gain certainty from the findings of
researchers.
While a dollar-value assessment of the value of rate-of-return research cannot be
provided here, it is worth noting that the dollar-value stakes for research on agricultural
production are much higher than for statistical information.  Instead of perhaps $150
million in annual public outlays on U.S. agricultural data, federal and state spending on
agricultural production research totals about $1.5 billion.  If rate-of-return research has
caused this spending to be 10 percent higher than it would have been otherwise, and if
that marginal spending generated a social rate of return 10 percent above the relevant
opportunity return, then the rate-of-return research generates a social gain of $15 million
annually ($1,500 million x 0.1 x 0.1).
Trade Liberalization Studies
In the last 20 years extensive social science research, both positive and normative,
has been undertaken on the consequences of the international trade policies of individual
countries and on the benefits of both regional and global trade liberalization.  What is the
value of that research?  In the 1990s a series of policy changes has occurred that make it
plausible that the value of this research has been substantial.  The most significantReturns to Policy-Related Social Science Research in Agriculture
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movement toward global liberalization of trade in agricultural products since World
War II was the agriculture agreement reached in the Uruguay Round of the GATT
negotiations, concluded in 1994 and being phased in over six years.  In addition to
relaxing some long-standing nontariff barriers to trade, the Uruguay Round agreement set
up arrangements under the new World Trade Organization that should help minimize the
use of health, safety, or other quality control measures as disguised measures of
protection for domestic industries.  The agreement also established important groundwork
for further liberalization through negotiations to expand upon the Uruguay Round
agreement at a later date.  Moreover, beyond global liberalization, important movements
toward liberalizing agricultural trade within regions have taken place in the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Mercosur agreement among Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, and the negotiations to bring Central European countries
into the European Union and increase the access of the newly independent states of the
former Soviet Union to EU markets.  In all these developments economists were
important not only in developing the public-interest rationale for liberalization, but also in
providing technical analysis and advice to both private-sector interests and to
governments.
In assessing the value of these activities, one may reasonably invoke what can be
called the “bootstrap” approach suggested by Harberger (1954).  He balanced the costs of
antimonopoly efforts of economists against his estimate that there would be an annual
gain in welfare of more than $300 million if monopolies were replaced by competition in
the U.S. economy.   Analogously, the estimates of the World Bank (1986), Tyers and
7
Anderson (1992), and others summarized in Blandford (1990) can be used to show that
the complete global liberalization of trade in agricultural commodities would bring net
social benefits of $30 to 40 billion annually.  So if trade were liberalized, and if that
liberalization were attributable in part to assessments by economists,  the social value of
those assessments could be estimated.  (But the work of economists who have argued
against trade liberalization must also be included on the cost side.)
Now that the Uruguay Round, NAFTA, and Mercosur are in effect, this issue can
be posed in a more practical context.  The difficulty is that these agreements appear to
have had only small effects so far.  But if even 2 percent of the gains from complete
liberalization have been achieved and economists can claim 25 percent of the
responsibility for this, then the worldwide benefit from the trade policy research of
agricultural economists would be $150 to 200 million annually (0.02 x 0.25 of $30 to $40
billion).Returns to Policy-Related Social Science Research in Agriculture
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Analysis of National Commodity Market Intervention
Many countries have changed their national policies in the past decade, usually in
the direction of free-market reforms.  New Zealand led the industrial countries by making
such changes in 1984–86.  The reform of the Common Agricultural Policy of the
European Union in the 1990s was a paler version of the New Zealand reforms, but it had
larger deadweight losses to begin with.   Many developing countries, notably Chile,
8
Argentina, and China, have implemented limited market-oriented reforms.  Other
countries, such as India and Egypt, seem to be starting out on similar paths.  The former
Soviet sphere is rebuilding its agricultural policies as part of its post-Communist
evolution.  Agricultural economists have taken part in analysis and debate in all these
countries.  In New Zealand, Hungary, Poland, Latvia, Ukraine, India, and Egypt, where
the author has been able to observe these debates, there is evidence that contributions of
economists have made a difference in the form and content of agricultural policies.  But
their impact appears marginal, and the reforms have typically not been extensive enough
to reduce economic waste and inefficiency.
It would be going too far even to guess the value of the economists’ by attempting
to quantify the real-income effect of their advice and the extent to which policy decisions
have been influenced by that advice.  However, there exists a more direct quasi-market
indication of economists’ value in this sphere. This is the willingness to pay for policy
research.  It is reasonable to use the willingness of the public to pay to place a provisional
lower bound on value of the analytical services provided by social scientists employed by
government agencies.  The lower bound is provisional because two further considerations
may weaken the case.  First, some theories about bureaucracy have suggested that
employees of government agencies may be paid more than the value of their output (see
the parallel arguments on agricultural production research in Pasour and Johnson 1982). 
Second, some public research and analysis is conducted largely if not entirely to respond
to or refute economic assessments by private-sector interests or foreign governments.  To
this extent, national income might remain unchanged if both sides reduce their efforts.  (A
similar point could be made concerning lawyers’ services, brand advertising, and military
preparedness).
This approach suggests valuing the output by looking at costs, as is often done in
measuring the services of lawyers, accountants, entertainers, and other providers of
intangible services.  However, because of arguments such as those referred to above, it is
useful to consider attempts to measure the value of the output independently.Returns to Policy-Related Social Science Research in Agriculture
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In the United States, the deadweight loss from farm programs can be estimated to
have been $4–5 billion annually in 1985–87.  This was mostly due to productive cropland
left idle (Gardner 1990, 59).  In 1990, policy reforms were undertaken that reduced the
deadweight losses substantially, arguably by three-fourths or more, principally by
eliminating annual acreage-idling programs.  This was done more dramatically following
enactment of the 1996 Farm Act.  The author has argued that agricultural economists
made a significant contribution to these reforms (Gardner 1996).  The influence did not
stem from quantitative estimates of deadweight loss, but from work on a variety of topics
that showed that the commodity programs cost taxpayers and consumers many billions of
dollars, but accomplished much less for farmers.  These findings did not influence
legislators directly, but through newspaper editorialists, government experts in both the
executive and legislative branches, and commodity group representatives.
It has to be recognized that economists have not spoken with one voice on
agricultural policy.  Pasour (1988) emphasizes the role played by agricultural economists
in putting U.S. commodity programs into place in the 1920s and 1930s.  However, it
would be wrong to say that because agricultural economists argue both sides of policy
issues, or first one side and then the other of the same issue, their efforts largely cancel
themselves out.  There appears to have been a consensus in favor of government action in
commodity markets before World War II that evolved into a consensus opposing such
actions in the 1980s and 1990s.   It could well be that the consensus was correct in both
9
cases — that commodity policies had net social benefits in the 1930s, as argued for
example by Cochrane (1993) and Clarke (1994), but that the policies generated net social
costs after World War II.
The key point is that these policy issues involve difficult scientific questions as
well as potent political forces.  In this case, the extent to which policy research has
reduced the range of uncertainty about the effects of public choices is an appropriate
indicator of the ex ante gains that should be attributed to the research.
Beyond the more sweeping work on agricultural policy, a larger body of economic
research has been devoted to particular questions raised in the implementation of farm
programs.  Examples are the amount of acreage that should be placed in set-aside
programs each year, the size of sugar import quotas needed to achieve legislated price
targets, selection criteria for land offered by farmers for inclusion in the Conservation
Reserve Program, purchase prices for butter and nonfat dry milk needed to reach the
legislated farm price of milk, the size of the export bonuses offered under the Export
Enhancement Program, and the rules needed to implement pilot programs in revenue and
crop insurance.  The provision of alternative answers for these and a hundred similarReturns to Policy-Related Social Science Research in Agriculture
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questions can reduce the efficiency loss from commodity programs by many millions of
dollars.  The net benefits are not quantifiable, but one can have greater confidence in an
appeal to the quasi-market mechanism through which government agencies hire
researchers because they believe the benefits from the findings justify the staff costs.  The
author had several years’ experience in negotiations on the budget of the Economics
Research Service (ERS), a part of USDA.  These took place within USDA, between
USDA and the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and between the
Bush Administration and the appropriation committees of the House and Senate.  In these
discussions, OMB made a serious attempt to weigh the value of services provided by ERS
against the agency’s costs.  It asked why agriculture was endowed with so many more
government economists, given the size of agriculture relative to other sectors of the U.S.
economy).  OMB ended up accepting an annual budget for ERS of more than $50 million
principally because of its acceptance of the ex ante value of the product in policy
formulation.
RESEARCH ON THE EFFECTS OF ADVERTISING AND PROMOTION
A narrower and more precisely defined area of inquiry is the effectiveness of
generic product promotion, generic meaning not specific to a product identified by a
brand name.  Such promotion is typically funded largely by producer groups, and the
basic issue is whether funding promotion is profitable for the industry.
A recent example is Blisard, Blaylock, and Smallwood (1996).  They estimate that
over a 10-year period, 1984–1994, generic advertising raised fluid milk sales by 5.6
percent, or 12.8 billion pounds.  Fluid milk advertising expenditures were $296 million
over this period.  Of these, $110 million were attributed to a $0.15 assessment on each
per hundredweight of milk sold, mandated by the Dairy and Tobacco Adjustment Act of
1983.  Blisard and his colleagues estimate the “gain per act-increased advertising dollar”
to be 117 pounds of additional milk consumption.
Should milk producers, and U.S. citizens at large, rejoice in this finding, assuming
that they can believe it?  To give a rough answer for milk producers, suppose that the
elasticity of demand, 0, is between !0.5 and !1.0, and that the elasticity of supply, g, is
between 0.5 and 1.5 (over a 10-year period of adjustment).  Then the price effect of a 5.6
percent demand shift (0.056/[g ! 0]) is between 0.022 and 0.056 for the range of
elasticities considered.  Using an average farm price of $11 per hundredweight, this
implies a price increase for farmers of between $0.24 and $0.62 per hundredweight.  With
2.3 billion hundredweight sold (12.8/0.056/100), the gain to producers, measured byReturns to Policy-Related Social Science Research in Agriculture
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producers’ surplus, is between $550 million and $1,400 million.  Since this gain was
achieved by spending $110 million, the implication of the research finding (although
Blisard et al. do not put it this way) is that the fluid milk promotion program is a good
investment for farmers.  Indeed they ought to spend more on promotion.
The gain to society as a whole must also consider the well being of milk
consumers.  There is no standard method for determining this in welfare economics.  If
advertising changed tastes, an underlying assumption behind estimates of consumer
benefit has been violated.  If advertising conveyed information, and the increased
willingness of consumers to pay for milk measures the value of this information to each
consumer, then consumers are no worse off as a result of the promotion program.  The
producers’ net gain is a rough lower-bound measure of society’s net gain.  
10
For this paper, the issue is how to value the social science research that led to the
net-gain estimate, that is, what is the value of studies such as Blisard, Blaylock, and
Smallwood (1996).  Many such studies have been carried out, and they tend to show that
promotion programs have substantial net benefits, at least to producers.   But the
11
accuracy of the findings is open to question, probably more so than the studies of gains to
agricultural research.  (With reference to export promotion programs, see Sumner 1995,
106–109, and works cited there.)  One of the policy actions often taken in promotion
programs is a vote by producers on whether to assess themselves.  In 1996 the sheep
producers, in a close vote, rejected their promotion program, despite the support of the
leadership of their main producer organization.
In the two-state, two-policy version of the Hirshleifer-Riley model of  valuation,
research on the consequences of generic advertising may have little effect on the action
chosen (impose an assessment on producers [A ], as opposed to not imposing an 1
assessment [A ]). This would be true even when the advertising delivers a message of 2
support for its message (advertising pays [S ]), as against advertising does not pay [S ]).  1               2
The reason is that the perceived quality of the research findings is low in the sense that
the likelihood of S  is not much different whether the research estimates the true state to 2
be S  or S .  In this case the posterior probabilities will be so close to the prior 1    2
probabilities of S  and S  that the ex ante gain from research will also be low.  Figure 2 1    2
illustrates the gain in such a case as G-H, the distance of the double-headed arrow.  The
ex ante gain may well be so low that it is not worth paying for the research, which is
possibly true for research on the value of generic commodity promotion.
In the case of promotion programs and other policy-related social science
research, there is another aspect to the issue in that private-sector enterprises orReturns to Policy-Related Social Science Research in Agriculture
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organizations themselves fund the research.  For example, the citrus industry has
commissioned studies of the value of generic promotion of orange juice.  So instead of
relying on public cost-benefit analysis, there is a market test for the ex ante value of
social science research.  Even if such market decisions are questionable, and they have
been questioned, for example, when people pay for stock market advice, one should not
be too quick to write off the research as not worth what is paid for it.  The payment, after
all, is voluntarily made by people who economists normally assume are rational.
COSTS OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY RESEARCH
The costs of agricultural policy research are mainly for personnel.  The directory
of the American Agricultural Economics Association (AAEA) lists about 730 people as
specialists in agricultural policy (category S840).  Many members list more than one
specialization, however.  The directory lists about 3,400 members, and 4,800 reported
specialties.  This suggests that 520 full-time equivalent AAEA members spend their
research time on agricultural policy (3,400 x 730/4,800).  Assuming that an average of 40
percent of the average academic working year is spend on research (as opposed to
teaching and extension), this implies that each year these members spent the equivalent of
210 years conducting agricultural policy research.  At an average cost of $60,000 plus 50
percent of that in benefits and overhead support, this amounts to $19 million annually
($90,000 x 210).  However, some agricultural policy research is done by specialists in
subjects in other than agricultural policy, resource economics, for example, and some
agricultural policy researchers are not members of the AAEA.  To roughly accommodate
these omissions, one can double the cost and round up to $40 million annually.
The relevant question about the benefits of U.S. policy-related economic research
in agriculture is, then, whether they add up to $40 million annually.  Without wishing to
claim much for the rather sketchy case studies, earlier discussions suggested annual
returns of approximately $5 million from value-of-information research and $15 million
for returns-to-research studies.  Assuming that the United States reaps 20 percent of the
gains from trade liberalization, research output in that area would be valued at about $40
million annually.  Assuming that one-third of the budget of the ERS is spent on
implementation research whose value is what is paid for it, the annual benefit would be
$20 million.  The value of broader agricultural policy research is impossible to estimate
with any pretense of precision.  In order to have a figure to work with, however, assume
that 1996 Farm Act reforms eliminate one-half of the $4 billion in deadweight losses of
pre-reform policies, and that 5 percent of the credit for this achievement goes toReturns to Policy-Related Social Science Research in Agriculture
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agricultural policy research.  This implies a $100 million annual benefit from this
research.
Summing up, the U.S. economy receives benefits equal to$180 million ($5 + $15
+ $40 + $20 + $100) from the $40 million spent on agricultural policy research.  Taking
into account remaining costs and benefits left out of these numbers; policy issues not
covered in this analysis, such as soil conservation, environmental and food safety
regulation, and domestic marketing policy; the lag between research findings and policy
results; and the uncertainty in all the benefit values given, one might double the costs and
place a doubling and halving range around the benefits.  One could then say that benefits
of between $90 million and $350 million resulted from costs of $40 to $80 million.  Even
with the most pessimistic view of annual benefits ($90 million) and costs ($80 million),
U.S. agricultural policy-oriented economic research pays.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper analyzes policy research as a source of information, primarily for
policymakers, who are Bayesian decisionmakers.  The value of their decisions depends on
the state of the world, and different policy choices are optimal depending on that state. 
The true state, however, is unknown, and the output of research is a reduction in
uncertainty about that state.  The value of proposed research is the ex ante addition to the
expected value of the social objective function.  This value is nonnegative for
decisionmakers who can accurately assess the likelihood that a research program will
reveal the true state.  But the value of the research may not justify the costs, especially the
costs of  research that is not expected to contribute significantly to the identification of
the true state.
The case studies of agricultural policy research considered in this paper suggest
that there are substantial net gains to the ongoing policy research agenda.  However, the
quantification of these gains is highly conjectural and narrowly focused on agricultural
economics in the United States.  Nonetheless, the conceptual framework and empirical
evidence given provide reasonable grounds to believe that policy-related research has
generated benefits that more than cover the costs.
One line of skepticism about this conclusion as a justification for maintaining or
increasing public support for social science research is that even if the arguments of this
paper are accepted in the aggregate, policy-related social science research in agriculture
could be managed more efficiently.  Many policy-related studies and publications, evenReturns to Policy-Related Social Science Research in Agriculture
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the entire output of some researchers, could have been omitted without loss.  So only a
part, and perhaps even a small part, of the research need have been funded.  With better
management, less policy research can be funded in the future without a loss of expected
future net benefits.
The flaw in that conclusion is its presumption that better management is feasible,
in the sense that winners can be picked in advance.  It is likely that, as with drilling for
oil, recruiting football players, or breeding racehorses, one has to back the low-return
efforts to get the successes.  As a practical matter, that is, if the policy research budget
were to be cut, it is likely that almost as many productive projects would be cut as
unproductive ones.   
12Returns to Policy-Related Social Science Research in Agriculture
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1. The calculations are:
State probability inelastic estimate    likelihood            estimate       
Prior state:  Given times probability, given
Likelihood of probability Posterior
Prior
Inelastic 0.5 0.8 0.40 0.40/0.55 = 0.727
Elastic 0.5 0.3 0.15 0.15/0.55 = 0.273
Given elastic ... ... 0.55 ...
estimate
Inelastic 0.5 0.2 0.10 0.10/0.45 = 0.222
Elastic 0.5 0.7 0.35 0.35/0.45 = 0.778
Given elastic ... ... 0.45 ...
2. Research can make the user worse off ex post if its findings are wrong:  for
example, if one is at T but the true state is inelastic, which has a probability of 0.2. 
Moreover, research can make the user worse off ex ante if he or she places too
much confidence in it.  One of the beauties of the Bayesian approach is that it
takes into account the likelihood that the research gives the wrong answer. 
However, that approach assumes that the user knows the likelihood of getting the
wrong answer.  If the research is of lower quality than thought, the posterior
probabilities should be closer to the prior probability of 0.5 than is shown in
Figure 1.  For example, if the message that placed the user at T (B = 0.78) should
really have placed him or her just to the right of H (B = 0.51), a decision to switch
policies would have been wrong and the ex ante value of the research would have
been negative.
3. Lave considered an economywide context and still estimated that better
information yielded a net loss, but he assumed that the opportunity cost of
resources in production (of raisins, the commodity he analyzed) was zero, and this
apparently drove his (informal) economywide assessment.
4. While the approach of Hirshleifer and Riley is identified here because they use a
diagram like Figure 1 to analyze the value of information, this approach to the
graphical analysis of the two-state decision problem under uncertainty goes back
NOTESReturns to Policy-Related Social Science Research in Agriculture
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to Savage (1972).
5. The 1990 Farm Act contained over 100 mandates and authorizations for studies,
reports, and pilot programs.  They typically reflected stalemate after extended
debate on other policy options.  The sum of studies became so large that section
2515, “Scarce Federal Resources,” was inserted, stating that the Secretary of
Agriculture may “rank by priority the studies or reports authorized by this Act and
determine which of those studies or reports shall be completed.  The Secretary
shall complete at least 12 such studies or reports.”  (U.S. Code, 104 STAT. 4075).
6. The Farm Act of 1990 required, and the Bush Administration also desired,
expansion of USDA’s data base on chemical use by farmers.  The expense of this
could be covered by cutting some of USDA’s National Agriculture Statistics
Services’ (NASS’s) ongoing statistical activity — commodity coverage or sample
size — or by adding to NASS’s budget.  It was decided to add to NASS’s budget,
despite general stringency in “discretionary” programs.  NASS Appropriations
went from $67 million in FY 1990 to $76 million in FY 1991 (U.S. OMB 1991,
341).
7. The “bootstrap” label indicates that the measure of value of the research depends
on the economic values that the research itself measures.
8. Blandford (1990, 425) cites an estimate of $13 billion (1985 dollars) annually as
the net loss in EU countries due to the CAP in the mid-1980s.
9. The evidence for this consensus in the 1990s is the near unanimity of agricultural
economists’ general views in Congressional testimony on the 1990 and 1995 farm
bills, and in expressions of net social costs of existing programs in outlets such as
Choices (see Gardner 1996).
10. The main possibility that would render this argument invalid would be if not all
consumers were influenced by the advertising.  Then the additional consumption
of some consumers would drive up that price for all consumers, and the added
costs to the uninfluenced consumers should be counted as a loss attributable to the
program.
11. Some studies have analyzed the consequences of promotion programs financed by
taxpayer funds, notably the Market Promotion Program (MPP, formerly Targeted
Export Assistance) which makes grants for the promotion of U.S. agricultural
products abroad.  Cost-benefit analysis of the MPP has been required by OMB. Returns to Policy-Related Social Science Research in Agriculture
Impact Assessment No. 9 May 1999
Bruce L. Gardner Page 23
23
Such analysis has estimated that the program has had substantial net benefits.
12. To this point it is natural to append the standard researchers’ refrain:  It might be
worthwhile to fund additional research on how to “pick winners” and in other
ways manage policy research better.Figure 1—Value of a research program 
to estimate the elasticity of export demand








Policy A2 (production subsidy)
Policy A1 (acreage control)
0.0 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.0
Figure 2—Value of a research program to estimate 
whether advertising pays for an industry
V (S1,A)
S1:  Advertising pays
V (S2,A)









Policy A2 (no advertising)
Policy A1 (advertising)
0.0 0.4 0.5 0.6 1.0
Note:  The ex ante value of the research program is the distance between G and H.
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